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COMMENTS

COUNTERSUITS TO LEGAL AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS: ANY CHANCE FOR
SUCCESS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen an increase in the number of professional liability actions brought against physicians' and attorneys. 2 In addition, there has been an increase in the average size of damage judgments awarded to successful plaintiffs
in those actions.3 Some claim that those two factors have
caused the price of professional liability insurance to soar4
and have caused insurance protection to be unavailable to
some professionals at any cost.' Thus, these factors are alleged
to have produced what is referred to as a "malpractice crisis. ' Although the malpractice crisis in the medical profession7 arose earlier, and is generally viewed as being more se1. It is estimated that in recent years medical malpractice claims have been increasing at the rate of about 10% per year. Adler, Malicious Prosecution Suits as
Counterbalanceto Medical MalpracticeSuits, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 51 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Adler].
2. Representatives of the insurance industry and independent observers have indicated that the attorney professional liability claims frequency quadrupled between
1973 and 1976, from about 1.8 claims to about 7.2 claims per 100 insurance policies;
that in 1977 claims would be filed against an estimated 8 out of every 100 practicing
attorneys; and that the latest figures available in August 1979 indicated a ratio of 10
claims per 100 policies in 1979. Pfennigstorf, Types and Causes of Lawyers' Professional Liability Claims: The Search for Facts, 1980 A.B.F. RES. J. 255, 258.
3. One major insurer indicated that between 1971 and 1975 the average amount of
the attorney professional liability claims paid had more than doubled - from $5,622
to $11,936. Pfennigstorf, Types and Causes of Lawyers' Professional Liability
Claims: The Search for Facts, 1980 A.B.F. RES. J. 255, 258.
4. The average medical malpractice insurance premium increased from $1,905 per
year in 1973 to $7,787 per year in 1975. Birnbaum, Physicians' Counterattack:Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical MalpracticeActions, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1003, 1016 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum].
5. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1016.
6. This term is being used to indicate both the "medical malpractice crisis" and
the "legal malpractice crisis." See notes 7-8, infra.
7. See generally Adler, supra note 1; HEW MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW
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vere, the legal profession is currently facing similar problems.'
This "malpractice crisis" is perceived by some, particularly
physicians, as being caused by an unprecedented increase in
the amount of unfounded litigation being launched against
professionals.' To combat this trend, physicians, and more recently attorneys, have brought countersuits against former patients or clients who are believed to have brought suit without
just cause. At first these countersuits appeared to be an answer to the malpractice crisis;10 however, it quickly became
evident, particularly from unfavorable decisions in state appellate courts in 1978,11 that the value of these countersuits as
an immediate solution to the crisis was slight, at best. Few
appellate courts have upheld a judgment in favor of an attorney or physician in a malpractice countersuit case.1 2 Countersuits have consistently failed because courts have looked disfavorably on such suits for policy reasons and have strictly
construed the tort theories upon which the suits have been
based."3
As the number of legal and medical malpractice suits
steadily rises, it becomes increasingly important to determine
if malpractice countersuits have any potential for success in
the future. This comment will attempt to make that determination. To understand countersuits in the malpractice area, it
is necessary for this analysis to begin with a brief examination
of how much of the malpractice litigation is, in fact, un-

REPORT]; Aitken, Medical Malpractice:The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective,3 W. ST.
U.L. REv. 27 (1975).
8. See, e.g., Brown, Protect Yourself! It's Later Than You Think, 40 ALA. LAW.

190 (1979).
9. See HEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 10; Adler, supra note 1, at 53.
10. See Rosenberg, He Sued His Malpractice Accusers Right Back for $3,000,000,
MED. ECON., Dec. 8, 1975, at 69, 75.

11. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Brody
v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. App.
1978); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978);
Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
12. There have been three cases in which an appellate court has upheld a judgment in a countersuit case. See Drasin v. Raine, No. 80-SC-501-DG (Ky. June 16,
1981) (opinion to be published, but unavailable at the time of publication of this
comment); Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1980) (discussed in text accompanying notes 91-93, infra); Peerman v. Sidicaine, No. 799711 (Tenn. App. Feb. 29, 1980).
13. See, e.g., Fee, Parker & Lloyd, P.A. v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. App.
1980); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
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founded. Next, the competing policy considerations underlying a malpractice countersuit will be set forth. With this background in mind, the analysis will shift to an examination of
the specific reasons for which courts have consistently rejected
countersuits. This will include analysis of countersuits based
on the traditional tort theories of malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, defamation, and infliction of emotional distress, as
well as the developing theories of professional negligence and
prima facie tort. Finally, the future of countersuits will be explored, including any possibilities of success in the courts or
through legislative action.
II.

UNFOUNDED LITIGATION

While there is little agreement on how many malpractice
claims are actually "unfounded" or "frivolous," it is generally
conceded that at least some are. 14 Indeed, some physicians allege that the majority of medical malpractice claims are unjustifiably instituted.15 However, there is little, if any, objective proof of these physicians' charges.
The increase in medical malpractice litigation has been attributed to a number of factors other than an increase in frivolous suits. One commentator concludes that the acceleration
in medical malpractice trials results from the general proliferation of civil litigation. Other sources have suggested such
factors as the increased use of health services and the utilization of more sophisticated medical procedures and technology. 11 Still another factor which has commonly been cited is
the breakdown of the traditional personal relationship between a doctor and his patient."' In any case, it is clear that
the increase in malpractice litigation has not been caused
solely by the increase in frivolous actions.
Little study has been done on what percentage of malpractice claims are unfounded. This is primarily because it is extremely difficult to define what constitutes an "unfounded" or
"frivolous" claim. What constitutes a frivolous claim to an in14.
15.
16.
FORUM
17.
18.

Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1017.
HEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
Sepler, Professional Malpractice Litigation Crises: Danger or Distortion, 15
493, 506 (1980).
Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1007.
Id.
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surer or physician may be viewed as an entirely valid claim to
a patient, who is unfamiliar with certain medical procedures,
and may have suffered what he believes to have been an inappropriate medical result.
Lack of study in the area makes reliable statistics rare. A
congressional study concluded that the majority of malpractice suits have proved justifiable. 19 However, one insurer indicates that the plaintiff wins only 10% of the cases that go to
trial. 20 One alarming statistic was the result of a joint screening panel of Pima County Medical Society and Bar Association of Tucson, Arizona. The panel reviewed 65 cases over a
period of twelve years and found that 88% were without
merit.2 These sources demonstrate the variance in estimates
on the percentage of malpractice suits which are unfounded.
One study focusing upon the number of malpractice claims
which are groundless was the United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare's Medical Malpractice Commission Report in 1973. The Commission concluded that
"[v]iewed together, the number of claims judged to be meritorious by malpractice insurers and the number in which payment was made to the claimant would seem to indicate that
the vast majority of malpractice claims are not 'entirely baseless,' as often alleged. 2' 2 This study indicates that although
there are some unfounded medical malpractice cases, the
number is not nearly as large as many physicians claim.2
In the final analysis, all that the various studies demonstrate is that the estimate of the number of frivolous suits will
vary depending on the source providing the figure. Iusurers
and physicians tend to view the problem as being severe,
while other sources indicate that the number of unfounded
claims is not significant. It is important to note, however, that
if the number of unfounded malpractice claims is small, at

19.

SUBCOMM. ON ExECUTIVE REORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERN-

MENTAL OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN 1 (Comm. Print 1969).

20. Brooke, Medical Malpractice: A Socio-Economic Problem From a Doctor's
WILLAMETTE L.J. 225, 228 (1970).
21. Id. at 229.
22. HEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
23. See McCaman & Hirsh, Prima Facie Tort and Physician Countersuits, 1979
MED. TR. TECH. Q. 365, 365-66.
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least part of the reason countersuits have been unsuccessful
must lie in the meritoriousness of the original malpractice
action.
Ill.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Several policy considerations have had a profound effect
on the way courts view malpractice countersuits. Foremost is
the essential public policy that all persons must have "free
and unfettered access to the courts" in order to settle their
grievances.24 The courts have consistently adhered to the policy that "the courts should be open to litigants for settlement
of their rights without fear of prosecution for calling upon the
courts to determine such rights."2 This policy is considered
essential to our legal system because without it, access to the
courts would be severely limited. Attorneys would be unwilling to undertake representation in close or difficult matters if
they were fearful of being held liable as insureds of the merits
of their clients' cases.28
Another important policy consideration is the fear that
countersuits will lead to endless litigation, with each defendant countersuing his former plaintiff ad infinitum.2 This interminable litigation would add further problems to an already overburdened court system. Accordingly, the fear of
endless litigation and the fear of chilling effect on the free access to the courts have caused courts to view countersuits disfavorably and to narrowly construe the elements of the tort
theories upon which they are based.
The somewhat ironic part of this view of countersuits is
that the policy considerations which support the courts' disfavor are also jeopardized by allowing numerous malpractice
claims. Increasing numbers of malpractice claims, at least
some of which are unfounded, create additional burdens on

the court system by adding congestion to the courts. 28 It is

App. 3d 940,
24. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill.
25. Id. at

-,

-,

381 N.E.2d 1367, 1375 (1978).

381 N.E.2d at 1375.

26. Id. at -, 381 N.E.2d at 1376; see also Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917,
123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975).
27. Freeman, Endless Litigation:Justice or Revenge?, 45 INs. COUN. J. 238 (1978).
28. Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1016; see also Comment, Counter-claimingfor
Malicious Prosecutionand Abuse of Process: Washington's Response to Unmeritorious Civil Suits, 14 WMLAMEmrE L.J. 401, 414 (1978).
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possible that the number of malpractice claims, particularly
frivolous ones, would be reduced if the courts allowed more
countersuits. Successful countersuits would demonstrate the
risks of pursuing an unfounded claim. More significant, however, is the problem of how "free and unfettered access to the
courts" can be achieved while effectively denying access to
some, i.e., the professionals who have been unjustifiably sued
for malpractice. This question has yet to be discussed by the
courts. Nonetheless, until now the balance between the social
interest in preventing unconscionable suits and the social interest in permitting a person to bring a suit when he believes
he has been a victim of malpractice has clearly been struck in
favor of the latter.

IV.

THEORIES OF RECOVERY

A.

Malicious Prosecution

The most popular legal theory upon which countersuits
have been based and, therefore, the theory which has been
dealt with most often by the courts is malicious prosecution.
The action for malicious prosecution originated in the common law of England as a remedy for unjustified criminal proceedings and has now extended itself, in the majority of
American courts, into the field of the wrongful initiation of
civil suits. 29 Generally, in order to prevail in a malicious prosecution action in a civil case, a plaintiff must prove five elements: (1) the institution or continuance of a prior judicial
proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) absence of
probable cause for the institution of the proceeding; (4) malice
in instituting the proceeding; and (5) damage to the plaintiff
as a result of the proceeding.3 0 These elements seem to be universally required and if any is lacking it will be fatal to the
action."' Plaintiffs in malpractice countersuits have encountered the most difficulty with elements (2) - (4) above, and in
some jurisdictions, element (5).

29. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 120, at 850-51 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
30. Id. at 850-56.
31. See, e.g., Fee, Parker & Lloyd, P.A. v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. App.
1980).
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Two views have developed in American courts concerning
what a plaintiff needs to prove in order to meet the damage
requirement of a malicious prosecution action. The minority
of jurisdictions have adopted the English common law rule
which requires a showing of "special injury" as an element of
recovery.32 Special injury includes wrongful arrest of the person, seizure of his property, or an injury different than the
normal incidents of defending a lawsuit.33 Such things as ex35
penses of litigation, 4 loss of time to defend the suit, loss of

business,3" damage to reputation, 7 and emotional anguish and
embarrassment 3 8 do not constitute such special injury. As a
result, in jurisdictions that have the special injury rule, the
tort of malicious prosecution as a countersuit in a civil action
is virtually useless.
The majority of jurisdictions have not adopted the requirement of special injury. 9 Rather, these jurisdictions have recognized the historical development of the special injury rule 0
and see no purpose for it in American courts. The majority of
jurisdictions believe that the difficult burden of proof the
plaintiff has in a malicious prosecution action will serve to restrain the frivolous institution of such claims and prevent the
resulting problem of endless litigation. 41 However, this reasoning has caused these jurisdictions to strictly construe the
other elements of a malicious prosecution action, particularly
32. The "special injury" rule arose in England in 1267, when Parliament enacted
the Statute of Marlbridge, which gave a right to the prevailing defendant to recover
his costs and attorney fees in a summary proceeding at the conclusion of the original
lawsuit. Thus, malicious prosecution was limited to cases in which the former defendant could show that he had sustained some "special injury" apart from the costs and
expenses of defending the prior suit. Because American courts generally do not allow
the recovery of attorney fees by a prevailing party, most states did not adopt the
English rule. Singer & Giampietro, The Countersuit,6 LGATION 18, 19 (1979); see
also PROSSER, supra note 29, at 851.
33. Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637, 641 (D.C. 1978).
34. Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 IlM.App. 3d 824, -, 382 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (1978).
35. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Il. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1371 (1978).
36. Id.
37. O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, _, 569 P.2d 561, 563 (1977).
38. Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Iowa 1978).
39. For a comprehensive list of the states which do and states which do not require the special injury rule, see O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, -,
569 P.2d 561,
564 nn.3 & 4 (1977).
40. See note 32 supra.
41. Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1022.
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the lack of probable cause and the existence of malice.42 This
strict construction approach has made the establishment of
these elements quite difficult for plaintiffs in the majority of
jurisdictions.
A malicious prosecution action may be brought against the
patient's or client's attorney as well as against the patient or
client himself. 43 While an attorney owes no specific duty of

care to a defendant in a case," he cannot totally ignore the
defendant's rights when instituting a suit.4 5 To prove mali-

cious prosecution against the attorney the same elements
must be proved as those which must be proved when the suit
is brought against the attorney's client alone.46 With this
background, the discussion can now shift to an examination of
some of the specific problems encountered in proving the elements of malicious prosecution in a malpractice countersuit.
It is well established that the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must prove that the prior judicial proceeding of
which he complains terminated in his favor. 47 This requirement necessarily prohibits the initiation of an action for malicious prosecution by way of cross-complaint or counterclaim
in the original proceeding.48 Several reasons have been advanced to support the favorable termination rule, but the rationale is generally based on three considerations. First, the
absence of the termination rule would encourage the expansion of a cause of action which is not favored by the law, since
bringing a counterclaim requires less time and expense than
42. See, e.g., Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1979).
43. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Il. App. 3d 940, -, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1371 (1978).
44. See, e.g., Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 376-79 (10th Cir. 1979).
45. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, -, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1372
(1978).
46. See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1023. For this reason, this comment discusses
the malicious prosecution action against the former patient or client and the former
patient or client's attorney concurrently, only distinguishing between the two types of
actions in areas where they have been treated differently by the courts. For an excellent article specifically dealing with an attorney's liability for malicious prosecution,
see Mallen, An Attorney's Liability for Malicious Prosecution, A Misunderstood
Tort, 46 INS. COUN. J. 407 (1979).
47. See, e.g., Wilson v. Brooks, 369 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Ala. 1979); Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (1971).
48. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 846, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr.
179, 181 (1971).
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does initiation of a separate action.49 Second, the favorable
termination rule prevents the inconsistent judgments which
could result should the defendant win the action for malicious
prosecution and lose the original claim.50 Third, without the
favorable termination rule, allowing both claims to be considered at the same time could prejudice the jury against the
plaintiff's claim since a countersuit in the same case would interfere with the typical plaintiff/defendant relationship in the
proceeding.5 1 Despite the general agreement in most jurisdictions that these are strong and practical policy considerations,
at least one state has taken legislative action which would allow malicious prosecution counterclaims to be filed in the
same action. 2 Nonetheless, due to the practical policy considerations behind the termination rule, it is unlikely that many
states will follow this lead and depart from the rule.
The favorable termination rule does not necessarily require a verdict or final determination on the merits in the
principal suit.5 3 Thus, the rule may be met by proving that

the action was abandoned or dismissed. 4 For instance, in
Minasian v. Sapse,55 an attorney brought a malicious prosecution action against a former client who allegedly filed a
groundless cross-complaint and counterclaim in an action for
recovery of attorney's fees. The California Court of Appeals
held that dismissal of the defendait's-cross-complaint and
counterclaim for "failure to prosecute" constituted a favorable
termination of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff for
purposes of stating a cause of action in malicious prosecution.5 6 The court reasoned that to test whether a termination
is favorable when there has not been an adjudication on the
merits, it must be determined if the termination "is of such a
nature to indicate the innocence of the accused ....

49. Id.
50. Id. at 846-47, 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
51. Id. at 847, 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
52. WASH. REV. ConE ANN. § 4.24.350 (Cure. Supp. 1980); see generally Comment,
Counterclaimingfor Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process: Washington's Response to UnmeritoriousCivil Suits, 14 WmLAisr L.J. 401 (1978).
53. See, e.g., Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal. App. 3d 823, 145 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1978).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 827, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (1978).
57. Id. at 826, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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Although abandonment or dismissal of an action may meet
the requirement of a favorable termination, a settlement or
compromise generally will not.5 8 In Wilson v. Brooks,59 an attorney brought suit against another attorney and that attorney's law firm alleging malicious prosecution arising out of a
prior malpractice counterclaim. The Alabama court noted
that although the prior malpractice counterclaim had been
dismissed with prejudice, the dismissal was part of a settlement agreement in which the plaintiff reduced his fee demand.6 0 Thus, the court held that termination of the prior
proceeding was not favorable to the plaintiff in all respects
and the favorable termination requirement was not satisfied
6
for purposes of the malicious prosecution action. 1
To succeed in a malicious prosecution action, the complaining attorney or physician must also prove that there was
a lack of probable cause for the institution of the malpractice
suit 6 2 No single definition of probable cause exists in civil actions. However, probable cause has generally been defined to
be "such reason supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the
6' 3
means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper.
The probable cause standard for an attorney who is being
sued for maliciously bringing a malpractice suit on behalf of a
client may vary slightly due to an attorney's ethical considerations," but basically the standard will be whether the attorney has a reasonable belief that the client has a tenable
claim. 5 In either situation, it is obvious that one need not be
certain of the outcome of a civil proceeding to have probable
cause for instituting such an action. 66
A recent Florida case, Fee, Parker & Lloyd, P.A. v. Sulli-

58. See, e.g., Wilson v. Brooks, 369 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1979); Hoppenstein v.
Zemek, 62 App. Div. 2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978).
59. 369 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1979).
60. Id. at 1225.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Fee, Parker & Lloyd, P.A. v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. App.
1980).
63. Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637, 639-40 (D.C. 1978).
64. See Berlin v. Nathan, 64 IMI.App. 3d 940, -, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (1978).
65. Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, -, 268 N.W.2d 673, 679 (1978).
66. Id.
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van,6 7 dealt specifically with the probable cause element of a
malicious prosecution countersuit. In Fee, an orthopedic surgeon brought a malicious prosecution action against his former patient and the patient's attorney, alleging that they had
maliciously prosecuted a malpractice action against him for
his treatment of the patient. 8 At the trial court level the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the physician in the amount of
$175,000.9 The appellate court reversed, however, holding

that the evidence established probable cause for filing a malpractice action against the surgeon and the insufficiency of evidence of lack of probable cause constituted plain error requiring reversal.7 0 The court noted that it was not necessary
to find that the surgeon was actually guilty of malpractice as a
matter of law. It was only necessary to find that there was
probable cause to believe that the doctor was guilty of
malpractice. 71
A plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action must also
prove malice in the institution of the prior proceeding in order
to be successful. 72 The term malice has received different in-

terpretations in the various jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions
require actual malice, which is generally defined as an evil or
sinister purpose, or wicked or malicious intent.73 Some jurisdictions use a similar standard in which malice exists only
where the charge is made with knowledge that it is false or
with a reckless disregard as to whether it is false.7 4 Although
this standard is not quite as strict as that of actual malice, it
is still difficult to prove malice in the context of a malpractice
action. Other jurisdictions have taken a broader view than
those above. Under their view, malice exists when an action is
brought primarily for a purpose other than the adjudication of
67. 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. App. 1980).
68. Id. at 414-15. The specific allegation in the original malpractice action was
that Dr. Sullivan performed an unsuccessful closed reduction of a fracture of the
plaintiff's forearm, necessitating insertion of a rod into the forearm, which later resulted in further surgery when the inserted rod was determined to be too long.
69. Id. at 414. Final judgment was entered for $75,000 plus costs after the trial
court ordered a remittitur in the amount of $100,000.
70. Id. at 419.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1976).
73. See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1025.
74. See, e.g., Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 599 (La. App. 1976).
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the merits. 75 Thus, this standard includes not only suits motivated by actual malice, but also lawsuits initiated to force a
settlement or those brought without an honest and reasonable
belief in their validity. There are also many jurisdictions
which provide that malice may be inferred from the absence
of probable cause."6 The result in these jurisdictions is that
generally there will be little problem proving malice once the
absence of probable cause is established.
The standard of malice that a jurisdiction uses in a malicious prosecution action is often an indication of the unwillingness to afford a viable countersuit remedy. For instance, in
7 a physician brought a malicious proseSpencer v. Burglass,"
cution action against an attorney as a result of an unsuccessful medical malpractice action brought by the attorney on behalf of his client. As the dissent pointed out,78 it was alleged
that the defendant lawyer had no medical or non-medical evidence of malpractice yet he filed and tried the suit. Nonetheless, the court held that allegations that the attorney "frivolously filed suit," that the attorney failed to interview
witnesses prior to trial, and that the attorney failed to obtain
competent medical advice did not constitute allegations of
malice. 79 Not surprisingly, the court also supported its position by noting the public policy of citizens being able to seek
redress in the courts.8 0 This strict construction of malice further enables jurisdictions to prevent countersuits. This is especially true in jurisdictions which do not have the protection
provided by the special injury requirement. 81
The final element of a claim for malicious prosecution, and
the one which has received the most attention, is the requirement that damage result from the prior proceeding. As noted
above, a minority of jurisdictions have adopted the English
rule which requires the proof of some special injury.8 2 In these
75.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 676 (1977).

76. Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 188, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745, 757
(1979).

77. 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1976).
78. Id. at 603 (Redmann, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 599-600.
80. Id. at 601. See also text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
81. See, e.g., Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976); Ammerman v.
Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978).
82. See text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
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jurisdictions, the special injury rule virtually eliminates the
tort of malicious prosecution and, correspondingly, its use as
an effective countersuit remedy. However, in the majority of
jurisdictions the damage requirement is rarely an obstacle to
recovery. In these jurisdictions the plaintiff in a malicious
prosecution action may recover attorney's fees and the costs
incurred in defending a groundless action.8 3 Thus such items
as loss of reputation and expenditures reasonably necessary to
defend against the proceedings 8' would be recoverable if
proved, satisfying the damage requirement.
The above discussion clearly indicates the problem faced
when an attorney or physician countersues on the basis of malicious prosecution. Since the malicious prosecution action is
generally disfavored by the courts, the attorney or physician
will have a difficult time relying on the theory in his countersuit. In the minority of jurisdictions, the malicious prosecution action is virtually useless due to the special injury requirement, while in the majority of jurisdictions the malicious
prosecution action is ineffective due to the strict construction
of the elements of probable cause and malice.
B. Abuse of Process
The theory of abuse of process, like the theory of malicious
prosecution, has been largely unsuccessful in countersuits
arising out of malpractice actions. Abuse of process is defined
as the misuse or misapplication of a legal process against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not
designed. 5 The essence of the tort lies in the use of otherwise
legal process to extort some collateral advantage from the defendant.8 6 Abuse of process has often been confused with the
tort of malicious prosecution,87 however, the two torts are distinguishable. One court distinguished the two as follows: "The
chief distinction between abuse of process and malicious prosecution is that the former rests upon the improper use of a
83. Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271,
84. Id. at -, 607 P.2d at 447.

-,

607 P.2d 438, 447 (1980).

85. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977).

86. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Wilson
v. Brooks, 369 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Ala. 1979); PROSSER, supra note 28, at § 121.
87. See Bretz, Abuse of Process-

401 (1971).

Misunderstood Concept, 20 Citv. ST.L. Rzv.
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regularly issued process, whereas the latter has to do with the
wrong in the issuance of the process or in causing the process
to be issued." 88 Another distinction between the two actions is
that in a malicious prosecution action the plaintiff must show
that the prior proceeding has terminated in his favor, whereas
this is unnecessary in an action for abuse of process.8 9 Further, in an action for abuse of process, it is unnecessary to
prove that the process was obtained without probable cause.9 0
Given the nature of abuse of process, the tort will seldom
occur in the context of a malpractice action. One successful
countersuit based on abuse of process has been successful at
the appellate court level, however. In Bull v. McCuskey, 91 a
physician sued an attorney to recover damages for abuse of
process. The physician contended that the attorney had instituted a malpractice suit against him for the ulterior purpose
of coercing a nuisance settlement, knowing that there was no
basis for the claim of malpractice. A jury returned a verdict
for the physician, awarding him $35,000 as compensatory and
$50,000 as punitive damages. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict.2 The court reasoned that the attorney's
offer to settle the case for the minimal sum of $750 when considered in light of his failure to adequately investigate before
filing suit and the total absence of essential expert evidence
supported the jury's conclusion of abuse of process.9
The allegation that a malpractice action constitutes abuse
of process because it is brought for the purpose of forcing a
95
settlement has been rejected, however.94 In Brody v. Ruby,
the Iowa Supreme Court denied the allegation, reasoning that
"[s]ettlement of actions is a positive goal of courts in order to
avoid unnecessary and lengthy litigation." 96 Thus, an abuse of
process action will not lie solely because the malpractice ac-

88. Wilson v. Brooks, 369 So. 2d 1221, 1222 (Ala. 1979).
89. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
90. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 856.
91. 615 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1980).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 960.
94. See Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267
N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978).
95. 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978).
96. Id. at 905; see also Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Iowa
1976).
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tion was brought for the purpose of obtaining a settlement.
However, if an attorney knows there was no basis for the
claim of malpractice and institutes the action for the ulterior
purpose of obtaining a nuisance settlement, then a finding of
abuse of process is proper. A malpractice action is seldom instituted simply to obtain a nuisance settlement and this limits
the use of abuse of process as a countersuit theory.
One other fact situation in the malpractice context has
met the requirements of an abuse of process action.9 7 A surgeon, unable to collect an overdue bill for performing a myelogram, sued his patient to recover his fee. The patient responded to this action by suing the physician for malpractice
in performance of the procedure. The surgeon counterclaimed
for abuse of process, alleging the patient had instituted the
malpractice action solely to avoid paying the physician's bill,
and that he had sustained damage to his reputation and expenses in defending the malpractice action.9 8 This situation
met the requirement of an abuse of process action since the
purpose of the malpractice action was to coerce the physician
into discontinuing his valid claim for fees.
Thus it appears that only in rare situations9" where an ulterior purpose is proven will the physician or attorney be able
to use abuse of process in a countersuit case. Moreover, even
the situation where a malpractice suit is brought solely for the
purpose of obtaining settlement, an abuse of process action
will still be unsuccessful unless the settlement sought is a nuisance settlement and the defendant knew there was no basis
for the claim of malpractice. Once again, the strict construction by the courts reflects their disfavor with countersuits in
general.

97. Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1040; see also Levine, I Beat a MalpracticeBlackmailer, MED. ECON., Feb. 23, 1976, at 65, in which the physician involved discusses
the case.
98. Shortly after the counterclaim was instituted, the malpractice claim was
dropped and the patient settled with the physician. Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1040
n.251.
99. Another situation that has been suggested when countersuits might be successful in the malpractice context is where a physician was named as a defendant
solely for the purpose of obtaining his deposition testimony. Singer & Giampietro,
The Countersuit, 6 LITIGATION 18, 22 (1979).
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C. Defamation
Defamation is the invasion of one's interest in reputation
and good name. It involves a communication to a third person
which affects the opinion others in the community may have
of another. 100 Under this general definition, it would certainly
appear that an attorney or physician would have an action for
defamation when he is groundlessly sued for malpractice.
However, defamation has been unsuccessful as a countersuit
theory regardless of the fact that the wrongfully sued physician or attorney may have been damaged by the litigation.
The reason is that nearly all jurisdictions grant an absolute
privilege to statements made in a judicial proceeding. 01 Thus,
courts have held that in a malpractice case, allegations of malpractice in the complaint and at trial are absolutely privileged
as part of the judicial proceedings. 1 02 As long as the alleged
defamatory statements are in some way relevant to the judicial proceeding,.an action for libel or slander will not be a successful theory on which to base a countersuit. Apparently the
only time defamation will be useful is when the malpractice
allegations are made outside the judicial process, such as
when statements are given to newspapers concerning the
3
0

case.1

D. Infliction of Emotional Distress
A tort remedy which has occasionally been relied upon by
wrongfully sued physicians or attorneys is the theory of infliction of emotional or mental distress. Generally, a party is subject to liability under the theory if, through extreme and outrageous conduct, he intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another.0 However, the conduct involved must be so extreme in degree and so outrageous in
character that it goes beyond all possible bounds of de100. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 737.
101. Id. at 776-77. American courts have said that there is immunity as long as
the particular statement is in some way relevant or pertinent to some issue in the
case. See, e.g., Umansky v. Urquhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 372, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547,
549 (1978).
102. See, e.g., Umansky v. Urquhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 371, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547,
549 (1978); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
103. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 781.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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cency.105 Thus, the cause of action would rarely be available to
the wrongfully sued physician or attorney unless some type of
outrageous conduct surrounded the bringing of the malpractice lawsuit. Most often, when infliction of emotional distress
is raised in a countersuit to a malpractice action, it will be
given little consideration by the court.106
E. Negligence
A countersuit theory which has been asserted against attorneys with increasing frequency is negligence in the prosecution of a malpractice claim on behalf of a client.10 7 Generally,
the alleged negligence involved is that the attorney has not
adequately investigated the facts before proceeding with the
malpractice claim. 108 Specifically, there are two bases for these
allegations of negligence. The first is that the attorney has
breached a duty owed to a third person to exercise reasonable
care in advising a client to commence a lawsuit against that
third person. 10 9 This type of negligence allegation is more
closely akin to the traditional negligence concept than the second type of negligence countersuit. The second is that the attorney has failed to comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, which prohibits
an attorney from instituting frivolous litigation. 110 The allegation is that the attorney owes the third party a duty to comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility and that the
attorney has breached that duty by failing to comply. 1 '
105. Id. at Comment d.
106. See, e.g., Joseph v. Markovitz, 27 Ariz. App. 122, 551 P.2d 571 (1976).
107. See, e.g., Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1979); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978).
108. See, e.g., Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978).
109. See, e.g., Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 180, 156 Cal. Rptr.
745, 752 (1979).
110. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, -, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (1978). The
specific provisions commonly alleged to be violated are DR 7-102(A)(1) and EC 7-10.
DR 7-102(A)(1) provides:
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit, assert a
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his
client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely
to harass or maliciously injure another.
EC 7-10 provides: "The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not
militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm."
111. See, e.g., Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978).
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Neither of the two types of negligence theories has proved
successful.
Courts have consistently rejected the notion that an attorney has a duty of care to third persons to refrain from bringing an unfounded lawsuit. 11 2 The position of the courts has
been that in the adversary context an attorney's duty is owed
to his client and the legal system and that it cannot form the
1 4
3
basis for a suit by an opposing party." In Bickel v. Mackie,
the court held that negligence was an improper standard on
which to base an attorney's liability to an adverse party."5
The court reasoned that an adverse party cannot, under the
law, rely on the opposing lawyer to protect him from harm
and noted that the very nature of the adversary process precluded such reliance." 6 In other words, as the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted in rejecting a negligence countersuit:
"[N]egligence does not exist in the abstract, it contemplates a
legal duty owing from one party to another and the violation
7
of that duty by the person owing it.""1
Courts which have considered negligence claims based on
an attorney's breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility have likewise rejected such claims." 8 These courts have
pointed out that the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly states that it does not undertake "to define the standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct.""' 9
Thus, it is reasoned that the Code of Professional Responsibility can furnish no basis for a private cause of action; 2 0
rather, it is suggested that a party who is required to defend a
groundless lawsuit should institute disciplinary proceedings
12
against the offending lawyer.
Clearly, there are strong policy reasons for denying the ex-

112. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978).
113. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, -,
381 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (1978).
114. 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
115. Id. at 1382.
116. Id. at 1381.
117. Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 379 (10th Cir. 1979).
118. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978);
Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978).
119. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, preliminary statement; see,
e.g., Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Iowa 1978).
120. Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Iowa 1978).
121. Id. at 908.
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istence of a duty to a third party defendant. Unless there is
some special circumstance, such as where a third party can
claim he is intended to benefit from the attorney's performance, 122 an attorney can be liable for professional negligence
only to a client. This is a necessary conclusion due to the responsibility an attorney has in the administration of justice
via the adversary system. 123 The lawyer's obligation to represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law, 124 together with the nature of the adversary system, requires that
the attorney be immune from liability for negligence in an action by a successful adverse litigant. 125 As the Illinois Appellate Court reasoned in the widely publicized countersuit case
126
of Berlin v. Nathan:
[W]e believe it would be contrary to public policy for us to
hold that an attorney has a duty to an intended defendant
not to file a weak or perhaps "frivolous" lawsuit since we
would be creating an insurmountable conflict of interest between the attorney and the client. The attorney owes a duty
to his or her client to present the case vigorously.... When
a tort action is brought he has but one intended beneficiary,
his client; the adverse party is certainly not an intended
127
beneficiary of the adverse counsel's client.
F. Prima Facie Tort
As a result of the strict construction of the various tort
theories mentioned above, a number of countersuits are now
being based on the somewhat novel approach of prima facie
tort. 2 " It has been defined as "the infliction of intentional
harm, resulting in damage, without excuse or justification, by
an act or series of acts which would otherwise be lawful." 2 9
122. An example is negligence in preparing a will. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 49
Cal. App. 3d 917, 920, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 239 (1975).
123. Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Iowa 1978).

124. See ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

EC 7-1.

125. Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Iowa 1978).
126. 64 Ill.
App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978).
127. Id. at -,
381 N.E.2d at 1376.
128. See, e.g., Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d
910 (1978); Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1978); Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62 App. Div. 2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Martin v. Trevino,
578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
129. Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, -,
405 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (1978).
Prima facie tort appears to have first been enunciated in 1904 by Mr. Justice Holmes
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By definition, prima facie tort does not fall within the categories of traditional torts. 3 °
The elements of a cause of action for prima facie tort that
have emerged are (1) an intent to harm on the part of the
defendant; (2) a lack of justification in so acting; and (3) special damages, alleged with particularity. 1 ' Basically, the reasons for the failure of prima facie tort in the countersuit context are the courts' fears that allowing the concept could
circumvent the special damages requirement in malicious
prosecution actions, abrogate the privity requirement of negligence actions brought against
an attorney, and preempt legis32
lative action in the area.1
The state which has most actively developed and expanded the theory of prima facie tort is New York. 3 3 A number of countersuits which have reached the appellate courts in
34
that state have pleaded prima facie tort.1
However, even in
New York, countersuit cases have had little success. In Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 13 5 the court held that the plaintiff had
failed to plead special damages. It failed to find that there was
"intentional infliction of economic damage without excuse or
justification."'
In Belsky v. Lowenthal,13 7 the court refused
to accept the prima facie tort rationale in the countersuit context, stating that "this rationale should not be an occasion for
setting aside large bodies of case law which have defined our
limits, established our guidelines and set forth the essential

in Aikins v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904), in which he ruled that even lawful conduct can become unlawful when done maliciously. 195 U.S. 194, 205-06 (1904).
130. See, e.g., Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, -, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64
(1978).
131. Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Special damage in the prima facie tort area has been held to include injury to professional reputation and harassment in some jurisdictions. See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1055-56.
132. Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 772-73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); see also
Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, -, 386 N.E.2d 821, 822, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911
(1978).
133. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1061.
134. See, e.g., Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62 App. Div. 2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542
(1978); Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1978); Drago v.
Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Gifford v. Harley, 62 App. Div. 2d 5, 404 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1978).
135. 62 App. Div. 2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978).
136. Id. at -, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
137. 62 App. Div. 2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1978).
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elements of traditional tort."1 8
One countersuit case which did receive some success, albeit
short-lived, under the theory of prima facie tort was Drago v.
Buonagurio.3 9 For this reason, it is important that the decisions in the Drago case be looked at closely. The Drago case
presented a rather unique fact situation. Dr. Drago was
named in a malpractice action and counterclaimed, asserting
that he had been named in the action even though he had no
direct or indirect association with the person to whose death
his negligence had allegedly contributed. Dr. Drago alleged
that he was subjected to a frivolous lawsuit as the result of a
malicious disregard for his rights and further alleged that the
patient's attorney employed the action as a discovery device
to ascertain where the responsibility for the death could be
placed. 14 0 The supreme court, special term, dismissed his complaint for failure to state a cause of action." 1 Specifically, the
court ruled that the prima facie tort claim failed because
there was no allegation of actual or special damages. 42
On appeal, the countersuit based on prima facie tort received its brief success when the appellate division reversed
the lower court.1 43 The appellate division agreed that an action did not lie on the basis of traditional tort theories, but
noted that "the law should never suffer an injury and a damage without a remedy."' 14 ' The court recognized that the use of

prima facie tort in the countersuit context was novel and then
noted that tort law is constantly changing to cope with society's changes. The court also noted the drastic increase in
medical malpractice actions during recent years, including
many which the medical profession considers baseless. The
court concluded that under the facts of the case there was a
cause of action since there was an intentional wrong, without
excuse or justification, causing apparent and foreseeable harm
138. Id. at -,
405 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
139. 89 Misc. 2d 171, 391 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1977), rev'd, 61 App. Div. 2d 282, 402
N.Y.S.2d 250, rev'd, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
140. 89 Misc. 2d 171, 172, 391 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (1977).
141. Id. at 173, 391 N.Y.S. at 63.
142. Id.
143. 61 App. Div. 2d 282, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1978).
144. Id. at 286, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
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to the plaintiff.1 45
The brief success of the prima facie tort was ended, however, when the Court of Appeals of New York reversed the
appellate division in a brief memorandum opinion. 14 6 The
court agreed with the supreme court and the appellate division, holding that the complaint did not state a cause of action under traditional tort theories. The court noted that
there were proposals before the legislature to create new liabilities in such circumstances, and thus stated that they
should exercise "judicial restraint in response to invitations to
recognize what is conceded to be perhaps a 'new, novel or
14
' 7
nameless' cause of action.
The three Drago decisions give limited hope to those who
wish to use prima facie tort as a theory of recovery in the
countersuit context. Other appellate courts in New York have
been unwilling to accept the prima facie tort rationale, reasoning that relief is available only under traditional tort theories. 148 Moreover, even the appellate division court that
handed down the favorable decision in Drago, later refused to
accept prima facie tort in the countersuit context in a case
where there was no "clearly intentional wrong.' 14 However,
given the right fact situations, there is the possibility that
prima facie tort will be successful if more courts adopt the
broader position of this New York Appellate Division Court.
A theory that is quite similar to that of prima facie tort is
one in which the claimed source of remedy is state constitutional provisions which provide that for every wrong there is a
remedy. 150 This theory was the basis of the claim on which the
physician successfully relied at the trial court level in the now
famous case of Berlin v. Nathan.'5' However, on appeal, the

145. Id. at -,
402 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
146. 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
147. Id. at -,
386 N.E.2d at 822, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
148. Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62 App. Div. 2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Belsky
v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1978).
149. Gifford v. Harley, 62 App. Div. 2d 5, -,
404 N.Y.S.2d 405, 408 (1978).
150. An example of such a constitutional provision is ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12,
which provides: "Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall
obtain justice by law, fully, completely, and promptly." For a similar provision see
OR. CONST. art. I, § 10.
151. 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978). See generally Birnbaum, supra
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Illinois Appellate Court rejected the constitutional argument,
holding that so long as some remedy for the alleged wrong exists, the constitutional provision does not mandate recognition
of any new remedy. 152 The court noted that the provision was
just an expression of philosophy and not a mandate that a
certain remedy be provided. 153 Other courts have consistently
agreed with the Illinois appellate courts that other similar
types of constitutional provisions do not provide looser tests
1 54
of traditional tort theories.
The above analysis of the various tort theories which have
been relied on in countersuit litigation and the responses
these theories have received from the courts indicates a bleak
picture for the attorney or physician who believes he has been
wrongfully sued for malpractice. Indeed, many attorneys conclude that the pursuit of countersuit litigation is too time-consuming and expensive given the small likelihood of success. 5 5

V. THE FUTURE OF COUNTERSUITS
A. The Courts
The success of countersuit litigation in the immediate future is not encouraging. Courts have consistently disfavored
such suits due to strong policy considerations and it is unlikely this view will change swiftly. Moreover, before the
courts change their stance, there will have to be a reevaluation
of the balance between the policy of open access to the courts
and the policy of preventing frivolous litigation. As with any
major shift in policy, if the change is to take place, it will be
slow and difficult.
For any physician or attorney who believes he has been
wrongfully sued for malpractice and is contemplating a countersuit, the following considerations are in order. First, a
countersuit should only be instituted where there is an objective belief that the original malpractice action was indeed frivolous. Too often countersuits are brought by physicians and
attorneys due to a sense of outrage and revenge. It is likely
note 4, at 1063.
152. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 IlM. App. 3d 940, -,
381 N.E.2d 1367, 1374 (1978).
153. Id. at -,
381 N.E.2d at 1374.
154. See, e.g., O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, -,
569 P.2d 561, 565 (1977).
155. Strategy, Countersuits in Malpractice Actions, 22 FoR THE DEFENSE 1, 2
(1980).
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that these countersuits never would have been instituted had
the allegedly wronged professional made an objective assessment of whether the patient or client had reasonable cause to
believe malpractice occurred. Second, from a practical standpoint, given the small likelihood of success of countersuits in
general, and the even smaller likelihood of success of a somewhat marginal case, the cost and time involved in instituting a
countersuit could likely be prohibitive. 15
The tort theories on which to base a countersuit must also
be closely considered. Some tort theories have little possibility
of success simply because they do not fit the malpractice context well in the first instance. These theories are abuse of process, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Except for unique circumstances, such as where the
malpractice action is brought to coerce a nuisance settlement
or where defamatory statements are made outside the judicial
proceedings, abuse of process and defamation should not be
relied on as the basis of a countersuit. Infliction of emotional
distress is an inappropriate basis simply because it is difficult
to perceive how the institution of any malpractice action, no
matter how frivolous, can be considered conduct so outra'1
geous "as to shock one's conscience.

7

The theory of negligence also holds little promise in the
malpractice countersuit context. The policy of privity in
which an attorney owes a duty only to a client and certain
intended beneficiaries of his professional conduct is a formidable one and courts will continue to adhere to it in the
future.
A tort theory which fits the countersuit context well is malicious prosecution. However, the requirement of "special injury" has virtually abrogated the use of this theory in minority jurisdictions.1 5 8 One possible way of meeting the special
injury requirement is to allege that the damage to a professional's reputation resulting from a maliciously prosecuted
9
suit constitutes an injury that does not result from all suits,

5

but it is unlikely that courts will accept this rationale. In the
156. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965).
157. See also text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
159. Beech, Malicious Prosecution: A Remedy for the Texas Professional, 42
TEx. B.J. 580 (1979).
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majority jurisdictions,16 0 the chances of success of the theory
of malicious prosecution are somewhat better. While the elements of the theory are construed narrowly in these jurisdictions, it would appear that in a truly egregious case the burden of proving the elements of lack of probable cause and
malice might be overcome. Until now there has been little
case law in these majority jurisdictions concerning malicious
prosecution countersuits. One factor which may still weigh
heavily against their success in majority jurisdictions is the
large body of case law against such actions which has developed in the minority jurisdictions.
The theory of prima facie tort perhaps holds the greatest
possibility for success in countersuits. One reason for this is
that many jurisdictions have not previously considered it and
so it will not be confined by the strictly construed formalistic
elements of the traditional tort theories.161 If prima facie tort
is to be successfully argued, however, it will have to be
presented in the nature of a balancing approach similar to
that used by the New York Appellate Division Court in
Drago.16 2 That court noted that the tort would not be applicable in every malpractice countersuit but only when there has
been a "clear intentional wrong." '6 3 While this standard might
only include a very egregious fact situation such as in Drago,
it would be the starting point for providing professionals with
protection against baseless malpractice suits.
B.

Legislative Action

It appears clear that in the near future there will be no
surge by courts to change their positions on countersuits. For
that reason, perhaps professionals should turn to the legislature to effect changes which will provide them remedies when
they are wrongfully sued for malpractice. This alternative appears especially valid since a number of courts have indicated
that they should exercise judicial restraint in the area and
leave it to the legislature to determine the policy to be

160. These jurisdictions do not require special injury.
161. See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1967).
162. See text accompanying notes 143-45 supra.
163. Drago v. Buonagurio, 61 App. Div. 2d 282, -, 402 N.Y.S.2d 250, 252, rev'd,
46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
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followed.""
In minority jurisdictions it might be possible to convince
the legislature to abolish the special injury rule in malicious
prosecution actions by pointing out the irrationality of retaining it in light of its historical development.le 5 While the
wronged professional would still have to prove the difficult elements of malice and lack of probable cause, he would at least
have a chance of success, which is virtually nonexistent now
under the special injury requirement.
Another legislative alternative would be a type of prima
facie tort statute. Admittedly, however, a legislature might be
hesitant to pass such a statute out of fear that it would foster
an innumerable amount of lawsuits.
At least one state has taken legislative action in the area
by removing the termination rule in a malicious prosecution
action and allowing a countersuit to be brought as a counterclaim in the original action." 6' However, this type of legislation does not solve the difficult proof problems one has under
the traditional tort theories, and the statute may in fact cause
more problems than it solves by having the effect of creating
167
vexatious litigation.
One final approach that has been taken by some legislatures is to award costs and reasonable attorney fees to the
party against whom a frivolous claim has been brought.16 8
This type of legislation does not affect the possible success of
a countersuit. However, it does provide the professional a limited remedy when a frivolous claim is brought against him.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is unknown exactly how large a problem frivolous malpractice actions are. However, it is clear that many physicians
and attorneys believe that they have had groundless malprac-

164. See, e.g., Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 822, 413
N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (1978).
165. See note 32 supra.
166. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.350 (Cur. Supp. 1980); see also text accompanying note 51 supra.
167. See, e.g., Comment, Counterclaimingfor Malicious Prosecution and Abuse
of Process: Washington'sResponse to UnmeritoriousCivil Suits, 14 WILLAMErrE L.J.
401, 421-22 (1978).
168. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 814.025 (1979).
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tice actions instituted against them and have turned to the
courts to redress the perceived wrong. Despite this, courts
have generally refused to provide these physicians and attorneys with any remedy due to a fear of infringing on the public
policy of open access to the courts. The policy of open access
to the courts is a sound one, to be sure, yet it is in obvious
conflict with the policy of allowing physicians and attorneys to
be free from defending unjustified malpractice suits. Courts
have made it clear that they perceive open access to the
courts to be the more formidable policy, and it is unlikely this
view will change in the near future. If the change is to take
place, courts must first reevaluate the balance between the
competing policy considerations. Such a reevaluation does not
appear imminent, however. The result is that in the immediate future countersuits will likely remain an ineffective means
of redressing the legitimate claims of physicians and attorneys
wrongfully sued for malpractice.
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